Hoch v. Vance Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 39788 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
2-11-2013
Hoch v. Vance Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 39788
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"Hoch v. Vance Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 39788" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 654.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/654
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLE D. HOCH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
VS. 
ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
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Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Nez Perce (Case No. CV 08-2272) 
*************************************** 
Honorable Jeff Brudie, Presiding 
W. Jeremy Carr 
Idaho State Bar No. 6827 
Clark and Feeney, LLP 
PO Box 285 
1229 Main Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Idaho State Bar No. 1563 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
1219 Idaho Street 
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Lewiston ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-1516 
Facsimile: (208) 746-2231 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature o[Case 
Vances dispute Hochs' limited view of the District Court's Summary Judgement ruling. 
The District Court stated what the scope of its summary judgement ruling was in its Findings of 
Fa~ts, Conclusions of Law, and Order: "The Court, in its summary judgement ruling, determined 
Plaintiffs deed conveyed ingress/egress easement rights on the upper road and also conveyed 'an 
easement over and across all roadways presently existing on the property herein being conveyed' 
but left for later determination whether the road now known as Buckboard Lane was a road 
'presently existing' at the time Cridlebaugh conveyed to Vances the property they now own." (R. 
Vol. II, P. 389, 390, L. 17-20, 1-2). It is this decision that Vances have appealed, and it was this 
decision that was raised in their opening brief. 
Statement o[Facts 
Vances dispute Hochs' statement of facts to the extent they state that the "upper road" 
included "Buckboard Lane." The respondents argued that Buckboard Lane was an extension of 
the "upper road" at trial. (R. Vol. II, P. 389, f9). This argument was specifically rejected by the 
District Court. (R. Vol. II, P. 392, 393, L. 23-24, 1-2). Hochs misinterpret the facts that were 
established by the District Court at summary judgment. The District Court Order granting 
summary judgment did not establish the route of the upper road. (R. Vol. II, P. 297, L. 17-18). 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Erred in Finding that the Warranty Deeds were not Ambiguous 
and in Excluding Parole Evidence to Determine the Intent of the Parties. 
The use of the term "roadways" in the warranty deeds does create an ambiguity. A deed 
is ambiguous if the intention of the parties cannot be ascertained from the deed itself. Machado 
v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 212, 280 P.3d 715, 721 (2012). Uncertainties should be treated as 
ambiguities. Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2005). The 
properties in question had numerous A TV trails and skid trails running across the property. (R. 
Vol. I, P. 73, L. 10-11 ). The term roadways does not have a universal meaning that is common 
to everyone. The term could mean a road that is passable by a two wheel vehicle, by a truck 
only, or by an ATV. 1 The District Court acknowledged this ambiguity when it held it could not 
determine what the parties viewed as a road from the deeds. (R. Vol. II, P 296, L. 24). 
The District Court incorrectly held that its inability to ascertain what the parties intended 
by the term roadways was merely an issue of fact and not an ambiguity in the deed. The District 
Court erred by not allowing parole evidence to show what the parties intended by "roadways." 
The District Court erred in excluding Jack Cridlebaugh's testimony to determine what he 
intended to constitute a roadway. 
1 See, Dr. James Cool, D.D.S. v. Mountainview Landowners Co-op Ass 'n, Inc. 131 Idaho 
770, 773, 86 P.3d 454, 457 (2003) where the Court held that the word swimming was ambiguous 
because it did not have a universally agreed upon definition. See also Stuck v. Parker, 108 Idaho 
929, 703 P.2d 693 (1985) where word mineral was held ambiguous. 
2 
Hochs argue the warranty deeds are not ambiguous and that the transfer language is of a 
historic, common and customary use in the transfer language. (Respondent's Brief, P. 12). 
However, Hochs do not provide an example of where such language has been historically used.2 
Hochs also misconstrue the District Court's Order granting Summary Judgement alleging that the 
upper road route was not in question and was clearly defined by the District Court on summary 
judgement. (Respondent's Brief, P. 11, L. 10-16). Hochs appear to argue that since the "upper 
road" was clearly defined by the parties at the time of summary judgement the ambiguous 
language found in the deeds (use of the terms "roadways;" use of both the singular and plural 
tense of "easement;" and the difference between the broader reservation language, easement for 
ingress and egress and all existing roadways, compared to the narrower conveyance language, 
easement for ingress and egress) does not create an ambiguity. This argument misconstrues the 
District Court's finding of facts at the summary judgement proceeding. 
The District Court did make a finding of fact as to the location of the upper road, but 
reserved for trial the issue of the "route or scope of the easement." (R. Vol. II, P. 297, L. 18). A 
close look at the District Court's Order will show that the "findings of fact" that Hochs refer to is 
merely the District Court reciting the facts the parties are alleging. (R. Vol. II, P. 291-292). The 
portion of the District Court Order cited by the respondents merely states what Mr. Cridelbaugh 
testified to but this testimony was contradicted by Sweets and Vances. Id. 
2 See, Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 3 99, 404, 195 P .3d 1212, 1217 (2008) where 
discrepancies from one conveyance deed to the next creates an ambiguity. 
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II. The District Court Misconstrued the Warranty Deeds and the Easements Mr. 
Cridlebaugh Conveyed to the Vances, Sweets, and Hochs when it Held that the 
Respondents had an Easement on the Upper Road and Easements on all Existing 
Roadways on the Vances and Sweets Property. 
The District Court, in its summary judgement ruling, held Hochs had an ingress/egress 
easement on the upper road and also had an easement over and across all existing roadways. (R. 
Vol. II, P. 389, 390, L. 17-20, 1-2). Vances have appealed the District Court's finding that the 
warranty deeds conveyed Hochs an easement over and across all existing roadways. One of the 
theories raised by Vances in their appeal brief was that the clear language of the deed restricted 
the easement conveyed to Hochs to ingress/egress easements. Hochs warranty deed only 
conveyed an easement for the purpose of ingress and egress. (Pl. Exhibit 107). 
When Mr. Cridlebaugh conveyed Vances their property he reserved to himself "all 
easements for ingress and egress running from public right-of-way to the above described real 
property which are appurtenances to said real property." (Pl. Exhibit 105). He then created a 
new easement "over and across all roadways presently existing on the real property." Id. The 
Hochs warranty deed does not convey the newly created easement over and across all roadways 
to the respondents. 3 Hochs have not made any argument on how their warranty deed, which is 
3 Hochs warranty deed does not include the conveyance language "over and across all 
existing roadways presently existing but only conveys to Hochs an "Easement for purpose of 
ingress and egress." (Pl. Exhibit 107). 
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limited to an easement for ingress and egress, includes the second easement (over and across all 
existing roadways) that Mr. Cridlebaugh reserved to himself. To the contrary, the Hochs 
acknowledge their easement is limited to purposes of ingress and egress. (Respondent's Brief, P. 
13, L. 1). 
In an attempt to avoid this clear restriction in their warranty deed, Hochs request this 
Court to limit its review of the District Court's summary judgement order to the upper road only. 
(Respondent's Brief, P. 15-16, L. 20-23, 1-4). This is not how the District Court viewed the 
scope of its summary judgment order. The District Court specifically stated its summary 
judgement order to be (1) Hochs had an ingress/egress easement over the upper road, (2) Hochs 
also had an easement over and across all roadways presently existing on the property at the time 
of conveyance, and (3) left for further determination whether the road now known as Buckboard 
Lane was a road "presently existing at the time Cridlebaugh conveyed Vances their property." 
(R. Vol. II, P. 3 89, 390, L. 17-20, 1-2). Vances appealed this summary judgement order. 
The District Court went on to state "If the portion of Buckboard Lane that currently exists 
on the Vance property was a 'roadway' at the time Cridlebaugh conveyed his property to the 
Vances, then it would fall within the reserved easement language." (R. Vol, II, P. 390, L. 3-6). 
The District Court later determined that Buckboard Lane was a roadway that existed at the time 
Mr. Cridlebaugh conveyed Vances their property. (R. Vol, II, P. 394, L. 3-9). Vances have not 
appealed the District Court's finding that Buckboard Lane was an existing roadway at the time 
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Vances purchased their property, but have appealed that Hochs warranty deed conveyed them an 
"easement over and across all roadways presently existing" on Vances property at time of 
conveyances. Hochs have not presented any argument that the Court did not err in ruling 
Cridlebaugh conveyed to Hochs an easement over and across all existing roadways. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above the Vances respectfully request this Court to reverse the 
District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order holding that respondents have an easement 
over the upper road and all existing roadways, including Buckboard Lane, and the Vances 
request this court remand this case back to the District Court with instruction to enter a 
judgement holding that the respondents warranty deed does not convey easements on the upper 
road or Buckboard Lane. 
In the alternative, the Vances respectfully request this Court vacate the District Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order finding the warranty deeds to be unambiguous and its decision 
to exclude parole evidence, specifically Jack Cridlebaugh's testimony that he only intended to 
convey to the respondents and easement on the lower road. 
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of February, 2013. 
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP 
By: 
-'-'<tr-----,~>'-7"--~~~--,,ry.<'-~~~~~ 
W. Jerem)l , a member o the firm 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7th day of February, 2013, I caused to be served 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Theodore 0. Creason 
Creason, Moore, Dokken & Geidl 
1219 Idaho Street 
PO Drawer 83 5 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
x Hand Delivered 
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